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Conclusion: The Future of International
Law and International Financial
Institutions
Daniel D. Bradlow and David B. Hunter
The starting point for this book was our concern about an anomaly in the legal
position of the international financial institutions (IFIs) that appeared to enable
them to operate without being subjected to any effective legal control. We found
this lack of legal accountability particularly troubling because of the profound, and
sometimes irreversible, impact that IFI operations can have in many of those
Member States that actually use their financial services.
The source of this anomaly seemed to lie in two gaps in the applicable legal
regime. The first relates to the applicability of international law to the IFIs.
The IFIs as international organizations are clearly subjects of international law.
This would seem to indicate that their rights, responsibilities, and obligations can
be defined by applicable international law and that they can be held accountable for
their compliance with applicable international legal principles. However, holding
the IFIs accountable under international law is difficult. Although their status as
subjects of international law is clear, their substantive rights and responsibilities
are not. The IFIs contend that many international legal obligations found in cus-
tomary law are not applicable to them and that they are not bound by treaties to
which they are not signatories. When the IFIs do recognize specific international
law principles as being applicable to them, they claim the discretion to decide how
Daniel D. Bradlow and David B. Hunter, International Financial Institutions and
International Law, pp. 387–397.
# 2010 Kluwer Law International BV, The Netherlands.
to operationalize these principles. The IFIs’ position is not without some force, but
it leaves uncertain the applicability of broad areas of international law, including
human rights, the environment, and labour, and allows the IFIs almost unfettered
discretion in deciding whether they are required to comply with particular
international legal principles. Their ability to decide for themselves both with
which international legal principles they will comply and how they should imple-
ment those obligations they accept is further enhanced by the fact that no obvious
international forum exists in which to test the IFIs’ exercise of discretion with
respect to their international legal responsibilities. The result is that de facto
international law imposes few constraints on IFI operations.
The IFIs’ privileged exceptionalism under international law is compounded by
the second sourceof the accountability gap– IFI claims to extensive immunity under
domestic legal regimes. Intriguingly, the scope of IFI immunity under municipal
law has expanded even as the scope of sovereign immunity has contracted. This
follows from the fact that the range of their activities and the depth of their pene-
tration into domestic policy-making has grown even as their immunity, unlike that
of states, has remained constant. As the contributors to this book demonstrate, this
immunitywas never intended to be absolute andhas beenwaivedwhen the IFIs have
deemed it necessary. Nevertheless, given their expanding responsibilities and scope
of operations, the extent of IFI immunity from either domestic suit or some other
comparable forum is becoming more problematic and a serious impediment to the
full legal accountability of the IFIs. While the IFIs do have a legitimate need for
some immunity, absent good justification this should not be broader than what is
necessary to carry out their mandates in a way that is consistent with all their legal
obligations. Such limited immunitywould remove the absolute barrier that prevents
all affected stakeholders from having their claims, that the IFIs should be account-
able for the harm their operations cause, adjudicated in some appropriate forum, but
would allow the IFIs to retain their functional immunity.
The net effect of these two gaps is that the IFIs are able to claim the power to
decide for themselves what law is applicable to them, and then to act on their view
of the applicable law. If, as Phillip Allott puts it: ‘Law constrains or it is a travesty
to call it law’,1 then IFIs are essentially lawless institutions.
Interestingly, international lawyers have not explored or rigorously analysed
the anomalous accountability gap identified above. We embarked on this book
project with the goal of seeking to fill this gap in the literature and to test our
contention about the apparently lawless situation of the IFIs. As one would expect,
the contributors to this volume have shown that the issue is more complex than we
initially postulated, but also that the rights, responsibilities, powers, and obligations
of IFIs are not at all settled and are in need of greater elaboration. Nevertheless, a
number of conclusions can be drawn from the contributions to this volume.
First, it is clear that the IFIs, like all inter-governmental organizations, are
subjects of international law. As such, their status, powers, and responsibilities are
1. Philip Allott, Eunomia: New Order for a New World (New York: Oxford University Press Inc.
1990), Preface, xlvii.
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defined by the treaties that create them – in the case of the IFIs, their Articles of
Agreement. In addition, they are governed by any other international agreements to
which they are signatories, for example headquarters agreements, relationship
agreements, and, in the case of the multilateral development banks (MDBs), their
loan agreements. Further, they are bound by applicable customary international
law and by any applicable general principles of law accepted by all nations. As the
contributions to this book demonstrate, there are both customary international law
and general principles of law applicable to the conduct of IFIs even if they are
difficult to operationalize.
Moreover, the conduct of the IFIs is constrained by those clearly defined
and universally accepted international legal obligations of their Member States.
As several contributors to this book recognize, it would be incongruous for the
international legal system to allow Member States to create an institution that can
violate legal norms that the Member States themselves cannot violate. Few would
argue, for example, that Member States, feeling constrained by their obligations
under international human rights law, could legally create an institution with the
power to violate those same human rights. Such a situation should result in the
Member States being held responsible under international law. However, this
should not necessarily absolve the IFI itself from responsibility for its own actions.
In fact, given the growing discretion, power, and reach of the IFIs in carrying out
their expanding mission, a failure to hold the IFIs responsible for their own actions
can result in the institutions, and their officers and agents, being able to act with
impunity. This suggests that the IFIs have their own international legal obligations
that are independent of their Member States, and that, to comply with good gov-
ernance, we need to define more carefully how their responsibilities are similar to,
and different from, the state’s responsibilities.
Second, the international legal principles applicable to IFIs are not neutral,2
they are heavily influenced by the interests and objectives of the IFIs’ key Member
States and by the role that those Member States want the IFIs to play in
international economic governance. This is significant because, historically, the
richest Member States – the United States, the Member States of the European
Union, and Japan – have dominated the decision making governance structures of
the IFIs, and so are able to direct decisions on issues related to how, and to what
extent, international law should apply to the IFIs. However, these Member States
are not directly affected by the IFIs’ operational decisions. In addition, because
they often seek to use the IFIs to advance their own agendas, it is not in their
interest for the IFIs to be constrained by international law, except perhaps in areas
relating directly to raising capital or ensuring enforcement of loan agreements.
Nevertheless, their decisions have direct and important impacts within thoseMem-
ber States that actually use the financial services of the IFIs. This situation, in
which there is a split between those Member States that have real decision-making
power in the IFIs and those that are most directly affected by IFI decisions, means
2. See, e.g., B.S. Chimni, ‘International Financial Institutions and International Law: A Third
World Perspective’, Ch. 2 herein.
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that the key decision-makers have power without responsibility. Not surprisingly,
therefore, the actual decision-making process in the IFIs has distorted the evolution
of international law with respect to the rights and responsibilities of the IFIs. It also
suggests that relying on other means to hold the IFIs accountable under
international law for their decisions and actions might both benefit affected people
and mitigate the adverse consequences of the current power imbalance between
those who have the most influence in the IFIs and those who actually use their
services.
This conclusion is particularly pertinent at the present time when power in
global economic governance seems to be shifting. The rise of new powers – for
example the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) – is beginning to
affect the ability of the hitherto dominant powers to control the IFIs, and therefore
their ability to control the IFIs’ decisions on international legal issues. Given that
these changes in international governance relations are still fluid and their eventual
resolution difficult to predict, their impact on the IFIs’ views of their international
legal obligations is difficult to discern. However, there is no reason to assume that
the rising powers, should they eventually gain greater say over the affairs of the
IFIs, will prove any less willing to use the IFIs for their own purposes, including in
regard to international law, than the current powers.
Third, and not surprisingly, the current accountability gap surrounding IFIs
does not affect all stakeholders equally. Member States have both legal and polit-
ical options for holding IFIs to account. Notwithstanding the significant imbalance
among Member States in legal and political power within IFIs, all Member States,
at least in theory, can use their ‘voice and vote’ in the governance structures of the
IFIs, and may be able to petition international tribunals, if need be, to hold
the institutions accountable. Those non-state actors who have contractual relation-
ships with the IFIs, for example, bondholders and borrowers, also have some
protections. Bondholders are able to enforce their contractual rights in national
courts because the IFIs waive their immunity in their financial contracts, while
borrowers of the MDBs are able to enforce their rights through the dispute settle-
ment procedures established in the MDBs’ loan or credit agreements.3 Addition-
ally, the IFIs’ employees have access to internal administrative tribunals in each of
the organizations.
There is, however, one important group for whom the combination of limited
application of international legal principles and extensive immunity from the
application of national law results in the IFIs operating essentially in a lawless
vacuum – non-state actors who are not in a contractual relationship with the IFIs,
but who are nonetheless directly affected by their actions. Until the relatively
recent creation of independent accountability mechanisms at the MDBs,4 such
3. The situation with the IMF is more complex because it claims that most of its financial transac-
tions with its Member States are non-contractual in nature. However, the Member States do have
some recourse, at least in principle, because they are able to raise their concerns through the
governance structure of the IMF.
4. The World Bank established its Inspection Panel in 1993. Then in 1994, the Inter-American
Development Bank established the Independent Investigation Mechanism, which was replaced
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affected people had no opportunities to hold the IFIs accountable regardless of the
extent of the harm theymay have suffered because of theseMDB operations. These
people are among those who are expected to benefit from international law relat-
ing, for example, to human rights and the environment.
It is important to note that the independent accountability mechanisms at the
MDBs have created a limitedmeans of accountability for these stakeholders. These
mechanisms are not empowered to offer non-state stakeholders compensation for
any harm they have suffered, or to order the IFIs to change their operations or
conduct. Some of the existing mechanisms have also had to undergo significant
revisions because they were not sufficiently independent or effective to provide
claimants with meaningful recourse. In addition, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) does not yet have such an independent accountability mechanism, and,
consequently, its non-state stakeholders have no direct means of holding the IMF
accountable.
The people affected by IFI operations and the civil society groups that rep-
resent them are increasingly arguing that the IFIs’ anomalous international legal
situation undermines their rights as recognized and protected under international
law. Their voices have joined the debate formerly monopolized by the Member
States and the IFIs, thus building pressure on the IFIs to reconsider their position
vis-a`-vis both the applicability of international law to their operations and the
extent of their immunity. Traditional boundaries are starting to crumble, and, as
reflected in many contributions to this volume, different strategies have emerged
for dealing with the international legal anomaly associated with the IFIs.
One way to resolve the accountability gap is to strengthen and clarify the
applicability of international law rules to IFIs as subjects of international law. This
would necessarily help clarify the responsibilities of the IFIs under international
law. This issue was discussed in the International Law Association study on
accountability of international organizations and is partly the goal of the
International Law Commission’s (ILC’s) ongoing exploration of the responsibility
of international organizations under international law.5 These efforts may even-
tually contribute to an understanding of the powers, rights, and responsibilities of
international organizations. However, they are unlikely, for several reasons, to be
sufficient in the near term to deal with the situation of the IFIs. First, these pro-
cesses are notoriously cumbersome and slow to react to the changing nature of
by the Independent Consultation and Investigation Mechanism in 2010. The European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development’s Independent Recourse Mechanism (IRM) was established in
2003, and in 2009, the Board approved the establishment of the Project Complaint Mechanism to
replace the IRM. The African Development Bank’s Independent Review Mechanism was
approved in 2004 and its operating rules and procedures were established in 2006. The Asian
Development Bank approved a new Accountability Mechanism in 2003.
5. For more information on the work of the International Law Commission as it relates to its
ongoing work involving the responsibility of international organizations, see International Law
Commission, Responsibility of International Organizations, <www.un.org/law/ilc/> (follow the
link for ‘Responsibility of international organizations’ under the Current Programme of Work
heading).
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international society. In addition, it often takes considerable time for their findings
and recommendations to become legally binding. Second, the ILC process has
stumbled by relying too heavily on state responsibility as an analogue for the
responsibility of international organizations.6 Although the analogy has value,
over-reliance on it tends to underplay the differences between states, which are
geographically defined and have general powers and responsibilities, and
international organizations, which can operate across regions and national borders,
but have particular structures and limited powers and mandates defined by their
founding treaties. Third, most discussion of the responsibility of international
organizations focuses on those institutions involved with peace and security. Much
less ILC attention has been focused on IFIs whose specialized monetary, financial,
and development mandates, as pointed out by several contributors to this volume,
raise a number of specific issues of responsibility under international law that may
not be as relevant to organizations dealing with international peace and security.
Many of the chapters in this book explore the general approaches that can be
taken to clarify the international legal obligations of the IFIs. Mackay, for example,
argues that principles of international law protecting the rights and interests of
indigenous peoples, including their rights of free, prior, and informed consent,
should be reflected in the internal policies of the IFIs.7 Similarly, the core labour
standards promoted by the International Labour Organization (ILO) or clear pro-
hibitions found in international environmental law should ‘constrain’ at least some
activities of IFIs. In recent years, the MDBs have begun responding to these
approaches. For example, in some cases, they have strengthened their internal
operational policies in ways that make their internal law more consistent with their
international legal obligations.
Clarifying the international law obligations of IFIs will also help build coher-
ence between the IFIs’ development objectives, their operations, and their
international legal obligations. This, in turn, will contribute to resolving the general
challenge of fragmentation in international law – there is no logical reason why the
situation of a person whose economic or social rights have been adversely affected
by the acts of a state or a transnational corporation should be given more attention
and protection than a similarly situated person whose rights have been adversely
affected by the operations of an IFI. As explained by McInerney-Lankford, an
expanded approach to human rights at the IFIs holds the promise of improving
policy coherence between the twin goals of development and human rights.8
Similar benefits are likely to follow from the International Finance Corporation’s
6. See Jose´ E. Alvarez, ‘International Organizations: Accountability or Responsibility?’, luncheon
address given at the Canadian Council of International Law, 35th Annual Conference on Respon-
sibility of Individuals, States and Organizations (Ottawa, Canada, 27 Oct. 2006), available at
<www.asil.org/aboutasil/documents/CCILspeech061102.pdf>.
7. Fergus Mackay, ‘Indigenous Peoples and International Financial Institutions’, Ch. 9 herein.
8. See Siobha´n McInerney-Lankford, ‘International Financial Institutions and Human Rights:
Select Perspectives on Legal Obligations’, Ch. 8 herein.
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(IFC’s) incorporation of labour standards into its performance standards;9 the
European Bank for Reconstruction andDevelopment’s (EBRD’s) clear endorsement
of free, prior, and informed consent for indigenous peoples;10 and the World
Bank’s prohibition against funding projects that are inconsistent with a country’s
international environmental treaty obligations.11
Thus far, however, the IFIs’ efforts at incorporating international law norms
into their internal laws has been somewhat ad hoc responding to areas where civil
society has been able to organize significant pressure on them. Thus, the IFIs have
never clearly stated that their policies will comply with all applicable international
law. Instead they have only made commitments in rather specialized and limited
contexts, for example in the environmental area. Such actions tend to reinforce the
view that they alone will determine what law applies to them and how it should
apply. Recent developments with respect to IFI policies relating to human
rights, including labour rights and the rights of indigenous peoples, suggest that
the IFIs are recognizing that their position on their international legal obligations is
problematic. They also raise hopes that the IFIs may move more decisively in the
future to define their human rights and related responsibilities.
One necessary consequence of the IFIs acknowledging their international
legal obligations will be a re-invigoration of efforts to strengthen the mechanisms
for reviewing IFI compliance, particularly given their continued immunity from
national courts. As noted above, all of the MDBs have created internal account-
ability mechanisms, albeit exhibiting different degrees of independence and effec-
tiveness. As pointed out by several authors in this volume, strengthening the
existing internal accountability mechanisms (e.g., the World Bank Inspection
Panel or similar institutions) is one way to improve IFI accountability. Suzuki,
for example, suggests expanding the function of existing administrative tribunals
that currently issue binding decisions with respect to complaints from IFI employ-
ees to incorporate other categories of complaints.12 He argues that these tribunals
should also issue binding decisions on appeals that third-party complainants
9. See IFC, International Finance Corporation’s Performance Standards on Social & Environ-
mental Sustainability, ‘Performance Standard 2: Labor and Working Conditions’ (30 Apr.
2006), 7–10, available at <www.ifc.org/ifcext/sustainability.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/pol_
PerformanceStandards2006_full/$FILE/IFCþPerformanceþStandards.pdf>.
10. See European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Environment and Social Policy, ‘PR
7: Indigenous Peoples’ (May 2008), 50–57, available at <www.ebrd.com/about/policies/
enviro/policy/2008policy.pdf>.
11. See World Bank, ‘OP 4.01: Environmental Assessment’ (January 1999), available at <http://
web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUAL/0,,
contentMDK:20064724~menuPK:64701637~pagePK:64709096~piPK:64709108~theSitePK:
502184,00.html>; see also Charles E. Di Leva, ‘International Environmental Law, The World
Bank, and International Financial Institutions’, Ch. 11 herein.
12. See Eisuke Suzuki, ‘Responsibility of International Financial Institutions under International
Law’, Ch. 3 herein.
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submit to existing accountability mechanisms.13 Chimni also calls for strengthen-
ing the legal basis and effect of the existing accountability mechanisms.14
These efforts to close the accountability gap at the international level should
complement (and not be a substitute for) efforts to close the gap from the bottom-
up – i.e., by reviewing the scope and extent of IFI immunity in national courts.
In this respect, as implied by Reinisch and Wurm, and as recommended by Herz,
the role of domestic courts should be expanded to accommodate the accountability
of IFIs to non-state actors. As these chapters explain, the IFIs’ claim to absolute
immunity has not gone unchallenged, even if the IFIs have thus far prevailed in
most cases. As these chapters show, the trend is against absolute immunity for
international organizations, just as it is for states. Some courts, before agreeing to
dismiss a case on grounds of an international organization’s immunity, are
inquiring into whether an adequate alternate forum exists. In their chapter, Rein-
isch and Wurm embrace recent national jurisprudence that suggests equity and
fairness should defeat the IFIs’ need for immunity, at least when third parties who
are wronged by an IFI’s activities have no other legal recourse.15 Herz agrees and
argues further that the purposes and scope of the IFIs’ functional immunity should
be narrowed over time to allow such third parties to bring actions in national
courts.16
Of course, defining the international responsibility of the IFIs or extending
national jurisdiction over their actions does not obviate the need for states to fulfil
their own obligations under international law in their relations with IFIs. As
McInerney-Lankford argues, some portion of the international legal responsibility
gap surrounding IFIs can be filled indirectly by ensuring that states fulfil their own
international obligations when they participate in IFI activities – either as donors or
borrowers. State responsibility for their own behaviour in the governance and
operations of IFIs is also an area that could benefit from further elaboration and
development. Addressing the issue of international legal responsibility from the
perspective of both the state and the IFIs should help ensure that neither states nor
IFIs are complicit in international law violations committed by the other.
An important issue in regard to this discussion, which is addressed in the
chapters by Bradlow and by Hunter,17 is the recognition that the IFIs are not just
passive recipients of rights and obligations under international law. Through their
internal operational policies and directives and their decisions and actions they are
often forced to deal with questions that raise unsettled international legal issues.
Their efforts to resolve or address these matters necessarily results in them
13. Ibid.
14. See B.S. Chimni, ‘International Financial Institutions and International Law: A Third World
Perspective’, Ch. 2 herein.
15. See August Reinisch & Jakob Wurm, ‘International Financial Institutions before National
Courts’, Ch. 4 herein.
16. See Steven Herz, ‘Rethinking International Financial Institution Immunity’, Ch. 5 herein.
17. See Daniel D. Bradlow, ‘International Law and the Operations of International Financial
Institutions’, Ch. 1 herein; David B. Hunter, ‘International Law and Public Participation in
Policy-Making at the International Financial Institutions’, Ch. 7 herein.
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becoming actively engaged in the creation of the international law applicable to
these issues. Examples of topics in which the IFIs are helping to shape the appli-
cable international legal principles are the rights of indigenous people; international
human rights law and development; the relationship between international orga-
nizations, states, and non-state actors; and the environment. The relevant substan-
tive international legal principles relating to these topics and their application to
the IFIs are discussed in a number of chapters in this book – for example, Mackay,
McInerney-Lankford, and Di Leva.18 In all these cases, the IFIs’ policies and
actions are both shaped by and help shape the relevant international legal princi-
ples. While the IFIs’ actions and decisions may not set binding international legal
principles in these areas, they do constitute informative and persuasive examples
that other international legal subjects use in formulating their own decisions and
positions on these issues. In this way, they are contributing to the accretion of
precedents that inform the creation of international customary law and the prin-
ciples incorporated into international agreements. In some cases, the IFIs’ policies
and actions create expectations about the type of treatment that stakeholders can
expect in certain circumstances, thereby helping to create applicable soft
international law that can affect the expectations of these same categories of sta-
keholders in their dealings with other economic actors. An example is the way in
which the IFC’s performance standards are influencing the expectations relating to,
and the conduct of, transnational banks.
The decisions of the independent accountability mechanisms are of particular
interest in this regard. Although not adjudicatory bodies, findings by the Inspection
Panel and the other accountability mechanisms necessarily depend on interpreta-
tions of the institutions’ operational policies. As pointed out by both McInerney-
Lankford and Di Leva, theMDBs’ operating policies often implicitly reflect norms
of international law. In some cases, the Inspection Panel has also explicitly
referenced relevant international legal principles, norms, and standards in making
these interpretations.19 In this way, the accountability mechanisms’ findings, and
18. See respectively, Fergus Mackay, ‘Indigenous Peoples and International Financial Institutions’,
Ch. 9 herein; Siobha´n McInerney-Lankford, ‘International Financial Institutions and Human
Rights: Select Perspectives on Legal Obligations’, Ch. 8 herein; Charles E. Di Leva,
‘International Environmental Law, the World Bank, and International Financial Institutions’,
Ch. 11 herein.
19. For a general discussion of the World Bank Inspection Panel reports and international law, see
Andria Naude´ Fourie, The World Bank Inspection Panel and Quasi-Judicial Oversight:
In Search of the ‘Judicial Spirit’ in Public International Law (Utrecht: Eleven International
Publishing, 2009). For a detailed discussion of the World Bank Inspection Panel reports regard-
ing human rights violations resulting from projects in Chad and Honduras, see Steven Herz &
Anne Perrault, ‘Bringing Human Rights Claims to the World Bank Inspection Panel’ (October
2009), available at <www.accountabilityproject.org/downloads/Inspection%20Panel%20and
%20Human%20Rights%20Oct09.pdf>. Herz and Perrault discuss theHonduras: Land Admin-
istration Project (2007) claim, which marked the first time the Inspection Panel addressed a
claim based on international human rights law. The Panel recognized that its mandate only
related to questions of compliance with the Bank’s operating policies, but found that these
policies mandated the Bank comply with provisions relating to human rights that are in the
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the sometimes legalistic responses of management, are creating a dialogue that can
contribute to the progressive development of the international law applicable in the
context of IFI operations.20
The evolving role that the IFIs play in the creation of international law high-
lights the relevance to international law of not only the substance of their internal
operating rules, but also their internal rule-making procedures, as has been dis-
cussed in some detail in the chapter by Hunter.21 While the substance of their rules
is shaped by and helps shape international law in some areas, their internal rule-
making procedures are in many ways path-breaking and establishing important
precedents in international administrative law. The IFIs have led the way in cre-
ating rule-making procedures that are relatively transparent and participatory.
The result is operating rules and procedures that have created expectations and
facilitated more communication between IFIs and the stakeholders who are most
affected by their operations. Hopefully, other international organizations will learn
from their examples. In addition, these procedures are deserving of more study so
that we better understand their role in international law creation, particularly in
creating law that can constrain the IFIs in the future.
The role of IFIs in the progressive development of international law is not
limited to their internal operational policies and procedures, however, as they are
also both deliberately and coincidentally shaping state practice in the context of
development. As suggested by both McInerney-Lankford and Di Leva, the World
Bank, in particular, sees itself as a significant player in helping countries meet their
international obligations.22 What these authors say about human rights and envi-
ronmental law, respectively, can also be true more generally of international law.
For example, the IFIs view strengthening the rule of law as a critical step in
maintaining a climate conducive for development. In this context, it is important
that the IFIs make sure that their advice is consistent with their own practices.
international agreements applicable to the project. Herz & Perrault, supra n. 19, 4. Similarly, the
Inspection Panel in Chad, the Chad: Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project (2002),
determined that the Bank had to consider international human rights principles when they
‘impede the implementation of the Project in a manner compatible with the Bank’s policies’
and not just when they have a ‘significant direct economic effect on the project’. Ibid., 5–6.
Further the Inspection Panel here found that the Bank neglected to consider the Democratic
Republic of Congo’s (DRC) obligations under the Convention for the Protection of the World
Cultural and Natural Heritage (World Heritage Convention) and the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), in Democratic
Republic of Congo: Transitional Support for Economic Recovery Credit and Emergency Eco-
nomic and Social Reunification Support Project (2007), available at <http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/FINALINVREPwhole.pdf>. Thus, the
Inspection Panel has routinely referred to international law when determining whether the Bank
has complied with its operational policies.
20. Herz & Perrault, supra n. 19.
21. See David B. Hunter, ‘International Law and Public Participation in Policy-Making at the
International Financial Institutions’, Ch. 7 herein.
22. See Siobha´n McInerney-Lankford, ‘International Financial Institutions and Human Rights:
Select Perspectives on Legal Obligations’, Ch. 8 herein; Charles E. Di Leva, ‘International
Environmental Law, The World Bank, and International Financial Institutions’, Ch. 11 herein.
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This means that they need to ensure that their operations within a country lead by
example and comply with applicable international and domestic laws.
A rising number of voices (including many in this volume) are calling for
increased exploration of the responsibility of IFIs under international law. The IFIs
themselves should become even more active participants in this debate. In this
regard, the IFIs, as well as international legal scholars and activists should sys-
tematically review the wide range of international law fields that are relevant to the
mission of the IFIs in order to identify applicable international legal principles and
to determine how they can most effectively be implemented in the work and
policies of the IFIs. They should also engage in debates about how the IFIs can
be accountable for their compliance with all their international responsibilities.
This book reveals both the complexity and the potential value of such a
dialogue over the relationship of international law and IFIs. It is our hope that the
book will stimulate the IFIs and all the stakeholders in their operations to actively
participate in this dialogue.
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